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การนำเสนอผลงานวิจัยเรื่อง "Revisiting the Day-of-the-Week Effect in the Stock Exchange of Thailand"

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วันศุกร์ที่ 25 พฤศจิกายน 2559 เวลา 16:00 – 16:50 น. ห้อง 206 คณะพาณิชยศาสตร์และการบัญชี มหาวิทยาลัยธรรมศาสตร์ ท่าพระจันทร์




Revisiting the Day-of-the-Week Effect in the Stock Exchange of Thailand

November 25, 2016 Anya Khanthavit Obrom Chaowalerd



Introduction (cont.)

- Thailand:
 - Liu and Pan (1997)
 - Could not find the effect.
 - Kamath, Chakornpipat, and Chatrath (1998)
 - . Could find the effect.
 - Holden, Thompson and Rungsit (2005)
 - Chukwuogor and Feridun (2006)
 - Lean, Smyth and Wong (2009)
 - Lim and Chia (2010)
 - Tangjitprom (2011)
 - Sattayatham, Sopipan and Premanode (2012)
 - Could find the effect.



- A myriad of empirical evidence shows the day-ofthe-week effect.
- In the U.S.:
 - French (1980)
 - Gibbons and Hess (1981)
- In international markets:
 - Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1993)
- In emerging markets:
 - Eastern European countries: Ajayi, Mehdian and Perry (2004)
 - ASEAN countries: Lim and Chia (2010)
 - Central European countries: Stavarek and Heryan (2012)

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Introduction (cont.)

- Contributions
 - We used the SET, SET50, and mai indices.
 - Examining the DoW effect for stocks of all major characteristics and groups
 - · Acknowledging the effect's firm-size dependence.
 - We examined and tested for possible alternative explanations of the effect.
 - Choudhry (2000): Partly the spillover from the Japanese market
 - Brooks and Persand (2001): Partly the co-movement with the world market
 - Thaler (1987), Pettengill (2003) and Philpot and Peterson (2011):
 Not been thoroughly reviewed
 - The data are from September 2, 2002 to August 31, 2015.



Methodology

• Gibbons and Hess (1981)

$$r_{t} = \delta_{Mo}D_{Mo,t} + \delta_{Tu}D_{Tu,t} + \dots + \delta_{Fr}D_{Fr,t} + \epsilon_{t}, \qquad (1$$



- Daily returns on the SET, SET50 and mai index portfolios
- Period: September 2, 2002 to August 31, 2015
- Total number of observations: 3,176

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Descriptive statistics

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics

Statistics	SET Index	SET 50 Index	MAI Index
Average	0.0426%	0.0434%	0.0340%
Standard Deviation	1.3344%	1.4885%	1.9011%
Skewness	-0.8446	-0.6859	-18.1303
Excess Kurtosis	0.124358	11.4165	697.2518
Jarque-Bera Statistic	20,842.93***	17,496.88***	6.4509e+07***
AR(1) Coefficient	0.0288	0.0169	-0.0291*

Note: and are significance at 90- and 99-percent confidence levels, respectively.

Empirical results

• Day-of-the-week effects

$$r_t = \delta_{\text{Mo}} D_{\text{Mo},t} + \delta_{\text{Tu}} D_{\text{Tu},t} + \dots + \delta_{\text{Fr}} D_{\text{Fr},t} + \epsilon_t, \tag{1}$$


Table 2
Tests for Day of the Week Effects

Statistics	SET Index	SET 50 Index	MAI Index
$\delta_{Mo} \times 100$	-0.1216*	-0.1184*	0.0036
$\delta_{Tu} \times 100$	0.0131	0.0184	0.1196
$\delta_{\text{We}} \times 100$	0.0897*	0.0788	0.0922*
$\delta_{\mathrm{Th}} \times 100$	0.0166	0.0143	0.0693
$\delta_{Fr} \times 100$	0.2053***	0.2144***	-0.1174
Wald Statistic	20.1328	16.7642	4.4868

Note: , and are significance at 90-, 95- and 99-percent confidence levels, respectively.

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- Data mining [Sullivan, Timmermann and White (2001)]
 - . The DoW effect could be an artifact from data mining.
 - However, the effect was consistently found by the previous studies.
 - Holden, Thompson, and Rungsit (2005)
 - · Chukwuogor and Feridun (2006)
 - Lean, Smyth, and Wong (2009)
 - . Lim and Chia (2010)
 - Tangjitprom (2011)
 - · Sattayatham, Sopipan, and Premanode (2012)



- Misspecifications of the distribution and heteroskedasticity assumptions [Connolly (1989); Chen, Lee, and Wang (2002)]
 - Kamath, Chakornpipat, and Chatrath (1998) employed alternative estimation techniques and tests for the DoW effect in Thailand. All the techniques and tests gave similar results.
 - This study recomputed the Wald statistics: The results remained unchanged even when the OLS covariance matrices were used in our Wald tests.

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Alternative explanations (cont.)

- The stock-settlement procedure [Gibbons and Hess (1981)] and the check-clearing procedure [Lakonishok and Levi (1982)]
 - The Friday returns are higher because of the risk-free benefits over the longer settlement and check clearing periods. Buyers are willing to pay more for stocks on Friday, hence leading to higher closing prices and positive returns.
 - The market micro structures of the main market on which the SET and SET 50 stocks are trading and of the mai market on which the mai stocks are trading are the same. If two explanations were correct, the test had to have found the DoW effect for the mai index portfolio too.



- The mispricing of stocks on Friday [Keim and Stambaugh (1984)].
 - If it is the Friday mispricing, the price must reverse on Monday, constituting a significant, negative autocorrelation of the Friday return with the Monday return.



Empirical results (cont.)

The Friday mispricing hypothesis

$$r_t = \delta_{Mo}D_{Mo,t} + \dots + \delta_{Fr}D_{Fr,t} + \rho_{Mo}D_{Mo,t}r_{t-1} + \dots + \rho_{Fr}D_{Fr,t}r_{t-1} + \epsilon_t,$$
 (2)

Table 3
Tests for Friday Mispricing Explanation

Statistics	SET Index	SET 50 Index
ρ_{Mo}	0.2555*	0.2185
$ ho_{\mathrm{Tu}}$	0.0087	0.0055
ρ _{We}	-0.0824	-0.0836
$ ho_{ m Th}$	0.0311	0.0048
ρ_{Fr}	0.0339	0.0281

Note: * is significance at a 90-percent confidence level.

• The Friday mispricing cannot be the explanation.

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Alternative explanations (cont.)

- Psychological behavior of investors [Pettengill, 1994)]
 - Investors were pessimistic on Monday and optimistic on Friday.
 - The psychological link cannot explain the DoW effect of those stocks on the main market.

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Alternative explanations (cont.)

- Information flow effects
 - General and macro information [Pettengill and Buster (1994)].
 - Micro, firm-specific information [French (1980)]
 - Firm might delay the announcement of bad news until the weekend to avoid market disruption.
 - Low activities of institutional investors on Monday, their strategic planning day [Wang and Walker (2000)].



Alternative explanations (cont.)

- Information flow effects: Micro, firm-specific information
 - Re-estimation of Equation (1) using re-defined Monday returns that were obtained from Monday opening prices and Monday closing prices.

$$r_t = \delta_{Mo}D_{Mo,t} + \delta_{Tu}D_{Tu,t} + \dots + \delta_{Fr}D_{Fr,t} + \epsilon_t, \qquad (1$$

Table 4

Tests for Micro, Firm-Specific Information Explanation

Statistics	SET Index	SET 50 Index
$\delta_{Mo} \times 100$	-0.1791	-0.1680**
$\delta_{Tu} \times 100$	0.0131	0.0184
$\delta_{\mathrm{We}} \times 100$	0.0897*	0.0788
$\delta_{\rm Th} \times 100$	0.0166	0.0143
$\delta_{\rm Fr} \times 100$	0.2053***	0.2144***
Wald	33.7580***	26.6558***

Note: and are significance at 90-percent and 99-percent confidence levels, respectively.





- Speculative short sales [Chen and Singal, 2003)]
 - Speculative short sellers did not want to hold the positions and take risks over weekends. So, they bought stocks to close their short positions, drove the prices up and, therefore, led to significant, positive Friday returns.

Alternative explanations (cont.)

Speculative short sales

	SBL not allowed	SBL allowed
SET	04/30/1975 –	01/05/1998 –
	12/31/1997	08/31/2015
SET50	08/16/1995 –	01/05/1998 –
	12/31/1997	08/31/2015

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Alternative explanations (cont.)

Speculative short sales

Table 5
Tests for the Speculative-Short-Sellers Explanation

	SET In	ıdex	SET 50 Index		
Statistics	SBL not Allowed	SBL Allowed	SBL not Allowed	SBL Allowed	
$\delta_{Mo} \times 100$	-0.0899*	-0.2078***	-0.6000***	-0.2204***	
$\delta_{Tu} \times 100$	-0.0801	-0.0211	-0.3342*	-0.0261	
$\delta_{\text{We}} \times 100$	0.0677*	0.1014*	0.0816	0.1002	
$\delta_{\mathrm{Th}} \times 100$	0.0334	0.0127	-0.2642	0.0034	
$\delta_{Fr} \times 100$	0.1787***	0.2512***	-0.0744	0.2730****	
Wald Statistic	34.5998 **	36.6054	6.0674	32.5959***	

Note: , and are significance at 90-, 95- and 99-percent confidence levels, respectively.

 Speculative short sales could not explain the DoW effect of the SET and SET50 index portfolios.



- The order-flow hypothesis [Miller (1988); Abraham and Ikenberry (1994)]
 - Increased trading activities of individual investors on Monday might lead to significantly negative Monday returns.
 - The flows must be net buy orders that are significantly higher on Friday than on any other weekdays.

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Alternative explanations (cont.)

- The order-flow hypothesis [Miller (1988); Abraham and Ikenberry (1994)]
 - (I) The volume turnover ratio, i.e. the aggregate trading volume over market capitalization, was tested for the DoW effect. The model was the one in equation (1) with the turnover ratio substituting for the daily return.
 - (II) The net-buy to market-capitalization ratio was tested for the DoW effect for trader groups.

Alternative explanations (cont.)

• The order-flow hypothesis (cont.)

Table 6 Tests for the Order Flow Explanation

Main Market				MAI Market					
Volume	Local	Proprietary	Foreign	Local	Volume	Local	Proprietary	Foreign	Local
Turnover	Institutes	Trader	Investors	Investors	Turnover	Institutes	Trader	Investors	Investors
	-0.0084	0.0207	-0.0079	-0.0044	110.9320	-0.0132	-0.0599	-0.0631	0.1362
	0.0054	0.0150	-0.2117	0.1913		-0.0832	-0.0102	0.0633	0.0302
	0.0774	0.0190	0.0081	-0.1045		-0.4975**	-0.0781	0.0932	0.4825
38.3968***	0.0421	0.0211	0.1166	-0.1798	128.8889***	-0.3188*	0.0083	0.2646	0.0459
26.0333***	0.1397***	-0.0785***	0.2152*	-0.2764**	124.4394***	-0.2933	0.0307	0.2860	-0.0234
26.1183***	4.4564	13.6749***	6.1657	7.2398	6.1677	4.3303	5.5148	2.3949	1.7248
(33.6305*** 36.4807*** 37.6044*** 38.3968***	Turnover Institutes 33.6305*** -0.0084 36.4807*** 0.0054 37.6044*** 0.0774 38.3968*** 0.0421 26.3355*** 0.1397** 4.4564	Turnover Institutes Trader 33 6305*** -0.0084 0.0207 36 4807*** 0.0054 0.0150 37 6044*** 0.0774 0.0190 38 3968*** 0.0421 -0.0281 -0.0355**** 0.1397*** -0.0785***	Turnover Institutes Trader Investors 33.6305**** -0.0084 0.0207 -0.0079 36.4807*** 0.0054 0.0150 -0.2117 37.6044*** 0.0774 0.0190 0.0081 38.3968*** 0.0421 -0.0281 0.1166 26.0555*** 0.1397*** -0.0785*** 0.2152* 26.1183**** 4.4564 13.6749*** 6.1657	Turnover Institutes Trader Investors Investors 33.6305*** -0.0084 0.0207 -0.0079 -0.0044 36.4807*** 0.0054 0.0150 -0.2117 0.1913 37.6044*** 0.0774 0.0190 0.0081 -0.1045 38.3968** 0.0421 -0.0281 0.0166 -0.1798 26.0555*** 0.1397*** -0.0785*** 0.2152* -0.2764** 26.1183*** 4.4564 13.6749*** 6.1657 7.2398	Turnover Institutes Trader Investors Investors Turnover 33.6305*** -0.0084 0.0207 -0.0079 -0.0044 110.9320*** 36.4807*** 0.0054 0.0150 -0.2117 0.1913 119.9294** 37.6044*** 0.0774 0.0190 0.0081 -0.1045 121.8382*** 38.3968** 0.0421 -0.078*** 0.1166 -0.1798 128.8889*** 26.0355*** 0.1397*** -0.0785*** 0.2152* -0.2764** 124.4394*** 26.1183**** 4.4564 13.6749*** 6.1657 7.2398 6.1677	Turnover Institutes Trader Investors Investors Turnover Institutes 33.6305*** -0.0084 0.0207 -0.0079 -0.0044 110.9320**** -0.0132 36.4807*** 0.0054 0.0150 -0.2117 0.1913 119.9294*** -0.0832 37.6044**** 0.0774 0.0190 0.0081 -0.1045 121.8382*** -0.4975*** 38.3968** 0.0421 -0.025** 0.1166 -0.1798 128.8889*** -0.3188* 26.0355*** 0.1397*** -0.0785** 0.2152* -0.2764** 124.4394*** -0.2933 26.1183*** 4.4564 13.6749*** 6.1667 7.2398 6.1677 4.3303	Turnover Institutes Trader Investors Investors Turnover Institutes Trader 33.6305" -0.0084 0.0207 -0.0079 -0.0044 110.9320" -0.0132 -0.0599" 36.4807" 0.0054 0.0150 -0.2117 0.1913 119.9294" -0.0832 -0.0102 37.6044*** 0.0774 0.0190 0.0081 -0.1045 121.8382*** -0.4975** -0.0781 38.3968** 0.0421 -0.0254 0.1166 -0.1798 128.8889** -0.2188* 0.0083 -0.0355** 0.1397** -0.0785** 0.2152 -0.2764** 124.4394** -0.2933 0.0307 -0.0781** -0.0785** 0.1367** -0.2785** 0.2152** -0.2764** 124.4394** -0.2933 0.0307** -0.2785** 0.1367** -0.2785** 0.1367** -0.2785** 0.1367** -0.2785** 0.2152** -0.2764** 124.4394** -0.2933 0.0307** -0.2785** 0.2152** -0.2764** 124.4394** -0.2933 0.0307** -0.2785** -0.278	Turnover Institutes Trader Investors Investors Turnover Institutes Trader Investors 33.6305" -0.0084 0.0207 -0.0079 -0.0044 110.9320" -0.0132 -0.0599 -0.0631 36.4807" 0.0054 0.0150 -0.2117 0.1913 119.9294" -0.0832 -0.0102 0.0633 37.6044*** 0.0774 0.0190 0.0081 -0.1045 121.8382*** -0.4975** -0.0781 0.0932 38.3968** 0.0421 -0.0254 0.1166 -0.1798 128.8889** -0.3188 0.0083 0.2646 0.0085** 0.1397** -0.0785** 0.2152 -0.2764** 124.4394** -0.2933 0.0307 0.2860 0.0081 0.0

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Alternative explanations (cont.)

• The spillover effects [Choudhry (2000); Brooks and Persand (2001)]

$$r_t = \delta_{Mo} D_{Mo,t} + \delta_{Tu} D_{Tu,t} + \dots + \delta_{Fr} D_{Fr,t} + \beta r_t^* + \epsilon_t, \tag{3}$$

Tests for the Spillover Explanation

		•	•		
	Japanese	Spillover	U.S. Sp	Large-Stock	
Statistics	SET Index	SET 50 Index	SET Index	SET 50 Index	Effect
$\delta_{Mo} \times 100$	-0.1050°	-0.0998	-0.1138	-0.1180	-0.0163
$\delta_{Tu} \times 100$	0.0109	0.0160	-0.0090	0.0253	-0.0033
$\delta_{\mathrm{We}} \times 100$	0.0722	0.0593	0.0879	0.0469	0.0196
$\delta_{\mathrm{Th}} \times 100$	-0.0056	0.0104	0.0045	0.0129	0.0039
$\delta_{\rm Fr} \times 100$	0.2000	0.2085	0.2059	0.2028	0.0147***
β	0.3462	0.3870**	0.2297	0.3066	0.8892
Wald Statistic	22.4557***	18.8600	22.0721	17.0966***	20.3233***

and are significance at 90- and 99-percent confidence levels, respectively

Alternative explanations (cont.)

- The firm-size dependence [Brusa, Lui, and Schlman (2000)]
 - The SET-listed small stocks, which contribute little to the valueweighted SET index portfolio, may not have the DoW effect.

Tests for the Spillover Explanation

	Japanese	Spillover	U.S. Spi	Large-Stock	
Statistics	SET Index	SET 50 Index	SET Index	SET 50 Index	Effect
$\delta_{Mo} \times 100$	-0.1050°	-0.0998	-0.1138*	-0.1180*	-0.0163
$\delta_{Tu} \times 100$	0.0109	0.0160	-0.0090	0.0253	-0.0033
$\delta_{\text{We}} \times 100$	0.0722	0.0593	0.0879	0.0469	0.0196
$\delta_{Th} \times 100$	-0.0056	-0.0104	0.0045	0.0129	0.0039
$\delta_{\rm Fr} \times 100$	0.2000***	0.2085***	0.2059***	0.2028***	0.0147***
β	0.3462	0.3870***	0.2297***	0.3066***	0.8892
Wald Statistic	22.4557***	18.8600***	22.0721	17.0966	20.3233***



A conclusion

- We revisited the day-of-the-week effect on the Stock Exchange of Thailand using daily return data on the SET, SET 50 and MAI index portfolios.
- The study found the DoW effect for the SET and SET 50 index portfolios but not for the mai index portfolio.
- Compared to the previous studies on the Thai market, the tests in this study are most complete.
 There is only one possible explanation—the order flow explanation.

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A conclusion

- The authors tested for alternative explanations of the DoW effect of the SET and SET 50 index portfolios.
- Compared to the previous studies on the Thai market, the tests in this study are most complete. There is only one possible explanation—the order flow explanation.
 - The buy order flows from local institutes and foreign investors drove the price up, hence constituting positive Friday returns and the DoW effect.
 - The negative Monday return was from net selling of local institutes, foreign investors and local investors in a significantly thin market on Monday.

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Questions and comments

Thank you.





Future research

- The next important questions are:
 - why local institutes and foreign investors were net buyers and drove the prices upward on Friday, and
 - why local institutes, foreign investors and local investors were selling on Monday.